Supreme Court Decisions
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-A-
Adarand Constructors v. Pena
(1974)
Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail
work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project
funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms
of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional
compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that"the contractor shall
presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans,
and other minorities...."Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause
inmost federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction
Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business;
Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid
had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales. The
question presented was whether the presumption of disadvantage based on
race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, was a discriminatory
practice that violated the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? The
Supreme Court held that it did. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497
US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed
by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review.
In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that
compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than
race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards.
However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of
disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications
must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even
proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present
or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the
Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.
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Baker
v. Carr (1962)
As in most States,
the Tennessee State legislature occasionally redrew district lines so that
the seats in the legislature reflected population changes. Across the State,
however, the counties with the largest populations tended to have the fewest
representatives. Census figures, reflecting imbalances almost as high as
20 to 1 in some districts, showed that "a single vote in Moore County,
Tennessee, [was] worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, [and] that one vote
in Stewart County or Chester County [was] worth nearly eight times a single
vote in Shelby or Knox County." These imbalances resulted in the rural
domination of the Tennessee legislature, which tended to overlook problems
of growing cities, such as Memphis and Nashville, where many African Americans
had settled. As of 1960 no changes in district lines had been made by the
Tennessee legislature since 1901, despite the growth of the cities and
other population shifts.
Nashville's
Mayor Baker filed a suit against the State in federal district court to
force a redistricting by the Tennessee legislature. He asked the court
to prevent Tennessee from conducting any more elections until districts
could be divided more evenly and fairly. Using the precedent of Colegrove
v. Green, 1946, the federal district court denied "standing" __ the
right to sue -- because the case was a Tennessee political question and
thus not a matter for a federal court. Baker appealed.
Oral
Argument
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Barron
v. Baltimore (1833)
John Barron was co-owner of a profitable wharf in the harbor of Baltimore.
As the city developed and expanded, large amounts of sand accumulated in
the harbor, depriving Barron of the deep waters which had been the key
to his successful business. He sued the city to recover a portion of his
financial losses. The question presented was whether the Fifth Amendment
deny the states as well as the national government the right to take private
property for public use without justly compensating the property's owner?
The Supreme Court held that it did not, and announced its decision in this
case without even hearing the arguments of the City of Baltimore. Writing
for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations
on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended
to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the
framers and the development of the Bill of Rights as an exclusive check
on the government in Washington D.C., Marshall argued that the Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not
applicable to the states.
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Bethel
v. Fraser (1986)
On
April 26, 1983, 17-year-old Matthew Fraser, a senior at Bethel High School
in Bethel, Oregon, spoke to a school assembly to nominate a classmate for
vice president of the student government. Students were required either
to attend the assembly or go to study hall. Prior to the assembly, Matthew
consulted three teachers about a short speech he proposed to present. Two
of the faculty said out-right that he would not deliver the speech because
it was "inappropriate." The text of the speech was filled with sexual references
and innuendos, although it contained no obscenities or vulgarities. On
the day of the assembly, Fraser delivered the speech with enthusiasm and
emphasis, and the "faculty and student body were stunned." The speech was
greeted by his classmates with hoots, cheers, and lewd motions. Kuhlman,
the candidate nominated by Matthew Frasier, was elected by a wide margin.
On the day after
the speech, Fraser was called to the office and told he "had violated the
school's disruptive conduct rule which prohibits 'conduct which materially
and substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including
the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.'" At that first hearing
Fraser admitted that he had used sexual innuendoes in his speech.
Fraser was suspended
from school for three days, and "removed from the list of students who
were eligible to make graduation remarks . . ." because school authorities
"no longer had confidence in his judgment. . . ." He ranked second in his
graduation class at the time. His parents appealed the school district's
disciplinary action. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld Fraser's right to
free speech. The school district then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Oral
Argument
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Betts v. Brady (1942)
A court in Carroll
County, Maryland, indicted a 43-year-old defendant, Betts, for robbery
in 1941. Betts could not afford to pay an attorney, so he asked the court
to appoint one on his behalf. The judge refused, claiming that such appointments
were made only in cases where the accused was charged with rape or murder.
Betts pleaded not guilty and acted as his own defense, calling witnesses
who supported his claim that he had been in a different at the time of
the robbery for which he stood accused. He failed, however, to convince
the judge, who found Betts guilty and sentenced him to prison for eight
years.
Betts appealed
his conviction on the grounds that the failure of the court to appoint
a lawyer to represent him denied his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
and his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's
decision in the case of Powell v. Alabama upheld the precedent of
"incorporation" -- extending the Bill of Rights to all States by way of
the 14th Amendment. Given the precedent, attorneys for Betts argued that
the Maryland court's refusal to appoint a lawyer for Betts violated "fundamental"
fairness as established by the Court.
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Bob
Jones University v. United States (1983)
This case concerned
Bob Jones University, a Christian school located in Greenville, South Carolina.
About half of the school's 5,000 students, from kindergarten through college
and graduate school, were studying for the ministry or some other Christian
service. As a private, religious school, Bob Jones University accepted
no federal, Sate, or local government funding. Nor, as a tax-exempt, charitable
organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Tax Code, did it pay any taxes.
The school's administration believed that the Bible prohibited dancing,
movies, jazz and rock music, as well as interracial dating and marriage.
These beliefs were enforced through a code of student conduct. No African
Americans were admitted to Bob Jones University before 1971. Between 1971
and 1975, only married African American couples could be admitted. After
1975, African Americans could be admitted regardless of martial status,
but the policy banning interracial dating and marriage was strictly enforced.
Meanwhile, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) became part of a concerted effort to combat
racial discrimination in schools throughout the country. The IRS determined
that the Federal Government had established a "public policy" that prohibited
the granting of any public subsidy to public or private educational institutions
that practiced discrimination. In the 1970s, the IRS ruled that a private
school could no longer be ruled a "charitable" organization unless its
admissions and educational policies were nondiscriminatory. The tax-emempt
status of discriminatory institutions would be revoked. Decisions by federal
courts and federal courts of appeals upheld the policy of the IRS.
Under
this new interpretation of federal "public policy," the IRS revoked Bob
Jones University's tax-exempt status. To recover its lost status, the university
paid a $21 unemployment tax to the Federal Government and then sued, as
a tax-exempt institution, to recover the money. THe IRS responded with
a bill for $490,000 in back taxes, which the agency said were owed from
1971 to 1975 when the university was tax-exempt.
Oral
Argument
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Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I) (1954)
Black children were denied admission to public schools attended by
white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according
to the races. The white and black schools approached equality in terms
of buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries. The question
presented before the Supreme Court was whether the segregation of children
in public schools, based solely on the basis of race, deprived the minority
children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
The Supreme Court held that it did. Despite the equalization of the
schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain inequality.
Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority
children because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held
doctrine that separate facilities were permissible provided they were equal
was rejected. In overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court held that
separate but equal was inherently unequal in the context of public education.
The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained
racial separation.
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Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II) (1955)
After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination
in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives
which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle.
Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and
the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court
requested further argument on the issue of relief. The question presented
was what means should be used to implement the principles announced in
Brown
I? The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I
required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility
on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school
segregation cases. They were to implement the principles which the Supreme
Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to
act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with
them "with all deliberate speed."
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Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
In the wake
of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in
political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates.
Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual
could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions
above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created
to enforce the statute.
The question
presented was whether the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and
association clauses.
In this complicated
case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that
restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates
did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance
the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against
unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction
of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures
by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation
on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these
practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that
individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting
them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment
on free speech and association.
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California
v. Greenwood (1988)
After learning
from an informant that Billy Greenwood of Laguna Beach, California, might
be trafficking in drugs, Police Investigator Jenny Jones observed several
cars making brief nighttime stops at Greenwoods's expensive home. Jones
asked the local refuse collector to turn over Greenwood's brown plastic
trash to police after the collector had picked up the trash at the Greenwood
residence. Investigator Jones, however, had never filed for a warrant to
conduct this "search" of the brown trash bags.
Police examined
the trash bags in detail and discovered a variety of drug-related items.
A warrant was then obtained to search Greenwood's home, where police found
cocaine and hashish. Greenwood was taken into custody.
Greenwood and
an alleged accomplice were prosecuted, but a California State court of
appeals dismissed the charges against Greenwood, citing State court precedents
and previous Supreme Court rulings against the admission of evidence obtained
in such a way. After the Supreme Court of California upheld the finding
of the appeals court, the State of California appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.
Oral
Argument
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Cruzan
v. Missouri (1990)
Thirty-two-year-old
Nancy Cruzan was in an automobile accident in 1983. Massive injuries resulted
in her falling into an unconscious state, unresponsive to outside stimulation.
She ws placed on life-support equipment and was fed intravenously for four
years. Nancy was not "brain dead," but the parts of her brain that controlled
bodily functions had atrophied and had ceased to function. Although doctors
felt that she could endure many more years in her present condition --
that is, with her life functions carried out by machine support -- her
own doctor said she had no chance of recovery.
In 1987, four
years after the accident and facing a hopeless prognosis, Nancy's parents
asked that their daughter's feeding tubes be disconnected. By then, most
of the $130,000 annual cost for her hospitalization was being paid by the
State of Missouri. The catastrophic cost of Nancy's care had exhausted
the family's resources in the preceding years.
A Missouri district
court granted the request of the Cruzan family, but the director of the
Missouri Department of Health took the case on appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court. Missouri insisted on a "high standard of proof" of Cruzan's wish
to die. The State argued that Cruzan's casual statement before the accident
that she "would not want to live as a vegetable" was not "clear and convincing
evidence" that she would want to be taken off the life-support equipment.
The Missouri Supreme Court refused to authorize the termination of artificial
feeding for Nancy. Life support was continued and the Cruzans appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.
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Argument
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Dennis v. United States (1951)
In 1940, just before
World War II, Congress passed the Smith Act, which contained the first
peacetime sedition laws since 1798. Among other things, the Smith Act made
it a federal crime to "advocate, abet, advise, or teach" the overthrow
or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence,
or to become a member of a group devoted to such an end. Not only was performing
any of these acts illegal, conspiring to do so was a crime as well.
The cold war
was the most important issue of the presidential campaign of 1948. The
Democratic Truman administration, feeling pressure from conservative Republicans
to ferret out alleged subversive elements, brought to court 11 leaders
of the Communist Party of the United States for violation of the smith
Act. They were not charged with any overt acts that contributed to violence
or revolutionary activity, but rather with conspiring to teach and advocate
such activity in order to overthrow the government of the United States.
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Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in
Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where
slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning
to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom,
claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott
then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained
that no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves
could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.
The simple question was whether Dred Scott was free or still a slave?
The Supreme Court held that Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III
and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be
a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship.
Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American
slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then
held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery
question once and for all.
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Edwards v. South Carolina (1963)
Nearly 200 persons,
mostly young African Americans students, marched on the South Carolina
State capitol to protest segregation in South Carolina. They marched in
small, orderly groups, from nearby Mt. Zion Baptist Church, and were permitted
to enter the gourds of the capitol provided that they remained peaceful.
One marcher held a sign that read, "Down with segregation!" Another sign
read, "You may jail our bodies but not our souls." The demonstrators listened
to a powerful speech by a local pastor, sang, stamped their feet, and clapped.
A crowd of less than 300 people gathered to watch the demonstration. The
onlookers were peaceful and appeared more curious than hostile. The absence
of any threatening remarks, hostile gestures, or offense language suggested
that the situation would remain that way.
After about
15 minutes, local police officials directed that the demonstration be stopped
and that the demonstrators leave the capitol area because they were causing
a disturbance. As more onlookers continued to gather, Columbia police feared
they would be unable to keep them from becoming angry and violent. Testimony,
however, later revealed that no "fighting words" had been spoken at the
time the order to disperse was issued.
Refusing to
leave, many of the civil rights protesters were arrested and tried for
"breach of the peace," including Reverend Edwards, one of the leaders of
the demonstration. The city manager of Columbia described the protesters
as having been "loud, boisterous and flamboyant." They were convicted and
fined, and Edwards appealed.
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Engel v. Vitale (1962)
In 1951 the
New York State Board of Regents (State Board of Education) approved a 22-word
"non-demoninational prayer" for recitation each morning in the public schools
of New York. It read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country." The Regents believed that the prayer could be a
useful tool for the development of character and good citizenship among
the students of the State of New York. The prayer was offered to the school
boards in the State for their use, and participation in the "prayer-exercise"
was completely voluntary. In New Hyde Park, New York, the Union Free School
District No. 9 directed the local principal to have the prayer said aloud
by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school
day.
The parents
of ten pupils in the New Hyde Park schools objected to the prayer. They
filed suit in the New York State court seeking a ban on the prayer, insisting
that the use of this official prayer in the public schools was contrary
to their own and their children's beliefs, religions, or religious practices.
The State court upheld the use of the prayer, "so long as the schools did
not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents' objections."
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Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
Danny Escobedo
was taken into custody by Chicago Police at 2:30 a.m. on January 20 in
connection with the shooting of one of his relatives the night before.
After an 18-hour interrogation, and without an attorney to represent him,
Escobedo was released, having made no self-incriminating statement. When
police later arrested Benedict DiGerlando, a friend of Escobedo, DeGerlando
told police that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots, and Escobedo was arrested
once again. Police told him that "although not formally charged, he was
in custody and couldn't walk out the door."
Escobedo's attorney
arrived shortly after his client had been taken into custody the second
time. The attorney was repeatedly denied permission to talk to Escobedo,
who was interrogated all night, from nine o'clock at night until five o'clock
in the morning. Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer "repeatedly," but
the police kept telling him that his attorney did not want to see him.
Throughout the interrogation, the suspect was kept standing, hands cuffed
behind his back. He was told that DiGerlando had accused him of the murder.
Allowed to confront his accuser, Escobedo told DiGerlando, "I didn't kill
Manuel, you did it." Becoming more emotional, Escobedo made statements
concerning his connection with the crime, which were later used to convict
him of murder in an Illinois court.
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Argument
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Everson v. Board of Education (1947)
A New Jersey
State law authorized local school districts to make arrangements and rules
for transporting children to public and private nonprofit schools. One
school district, Eqing Township, directed students to use the public bus
system to get to and from school, and then reimbursed their parents for
the costs. The township made payments to parents of both public school
students and students of private, Catholic schools -- payments that
were permitted under State law.
One taxpayer,
a Mr. Everson, brought suit against the Board of Education. In State court,
he argued that money collected as taxes for public education was being
used instead to help support students of private schools -- private schools
that provided religious education on behalf of a particular church. Everson
claimed that the payments to parents of parochial school students violated
the constitutional guarantee against the "establishment" of a religion
contained in the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution. The school
board, Everson believed, had violated the constitutionally guaranteed "separation
of church and state."
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Ex parte Milligan (1866)
Lambdin P. Milligan
was arrested in Indiana in 1864 upon the orders of one General Hovey, commander
of the military district of Indiana. He was accused of conspiring against
the United States and "giving aid and comfort to its enemies" -- the South.
He was tried in a military court created under Lincoln's orders. The court
convicted Milligan of various acts of treason and disloyalty and sentenced
him to death by hanging on May 19, 1865. Milligan appealed to the
federal courts, claiming that his right to a trial by jury had been denied
and that the proceedings of the military court were unconstitutional. Lower
federal courts refused to issue an order to bring the case into the regular
federal court system, and the case was finally appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
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Furman v. Georgia (1972)
The Furman
case consolidated appeals from three convicted murderers serving out sentences
on death row. The lead case was that of William Henry Furman, a 26-year-old
African American, who had broken into a home with the intent to commit
theft. The home owner surprised Furman, however, and attempted to
apprehend him. Furman, armed with a revolver, ran away. While fleeing,
Furman said he "dropped his gun, which discharged and killed the home owner."
Furman was arrested, tried, and found guilty of murder. The jury had the
choice of sentencing Furman to life imprisonment or to death. It chose
death.
The other cases
were those of Lucius Jackson, Jr., who had been convicted of sexual assault
and sentenced to death, also in Georgia, and Elmer Branch, who awaited
execution in Texas after being convicted of sexual assault. These two men
were also African American.
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Argument
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Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)
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Gibbons
v. Ogden (1824)
In
1807, Robert Fulton's steamboat, the Claremont, successfully navigated
the Hudson River in New York. Fulton and his partner, Robert Livingston,
negotiated a deal whereby the New York State legislature would grant them
an exclusive, long-term contract to operate and license all steam powered
vessels in the waters of New York. Aaron Ogden obtained a license from
Livingston to operate steam powered ferry boats on the Hudson between New
York and New Jersey. Meanwhile, in New Jersey, Thomas Gibbons made his
living carrying passengers by steamboat from the small town of Elizabethport,
New Jersey, just outside New York harbor, to New York City. Gibbons operated
under a coasting license granted by the Federal Government, rather than
under a license issued by either State. Because Gibbons had no New York
license, Ogden asked the New York courts to issue an injunction forbidding
him landing rights to the port of New York. The New York courts issued
the requested injunction.
Gibbons appealed
to the United States courts, arguing that his possession of a federal coasting
license superseded New York State's licensing requirements.
Abstract
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Gideon
v. Wainwright (1962)
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Gitlow
v. New York (1925)
During the Red
Scare, officials in New York State actively sought to enforce a law forbidding
"criminal anarchy," passed by the State in 1902. The law imposed criminal
penalties on anyone who advocated a violent overthrow of the government.
Benjamin Gitlow
was a member of the Left Wing faction of the American Socialist party,
a faction formed in opposition to that party's advocacy of moderate socialism
in the United States, rather than revolution. In 1919, the Left Wing announced
their break from the party at a convention in New York City. They advocated
more immediate attempts to bring socialism to American, including the use
of violence. The Left Wing convention appointed a writing committee to
create a "Left Wing Manifesto" under Gitlow's leadership. Modeled on the
Communist
Manifesto by Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, the
Left Wing Manifesto
advocated
the overthrow of organized government by force, violence, and other unlawful
means.
Sixteen thousands
copies of the manifesto were printed, wrapped, and mailed under Gitlow's
leadership. The June issue of Gitlow's radical pamphlet, The Revolutionary
Age, reprinted the document. Gitlow signed a card in support of circulating
the manifesto among membership of the American Socialist Party's left wing,
and traveled to different parts of New York to publicly advocate the manifesto
and its principles. He was arrested, charged with criminal anarchy, convicted,
and sentenced.
Abstract
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Goss
v. Lopez (1975)
The storm of
student protest movements that had broken out on college campuses in the
1960s and during the Vietnam War had, by the early 1970s, spread to many
high schools. In 1971 widespread student unrest took place in the Columbus,
Ohio, public schools. A number of students who either participated in or
were present at demonstrations held on school grounds were suspended. Many
suspensions were for a period of 10 days. Suspended students did not receive
hearings before their suspensions were imposed, though some students and
their parents met in informal conferences with school officials at a later
date. A number of students, through their parents, sued the school board.
The Supreme Court of Ohio found the State laws permitting the suspensions
unconstitutional. School officials appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
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Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
In the early 1960s, the use of any "drug, medicinal article or instrument"
for birth control was prohibited by a State law in Connecticut. The law
declared: "Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands
another" to use these forms of birth control could be "prosecuted and punished
as if he were the principal offender." The Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut, a nonprofit agency which disseminated birth control information
and counseled people about various birth control methods, defied the law
by continuing to operate its Hew Haven clinic. Estelle Griswold, the clinic's
executive director, and Dr. Buxton, its medical director, were arrested,
tried, and convicted of giving information, instruction, and medical advice
about birth control to married persons. Although the fines were not large
($100 each), Griswold and Buxton appealed their convictions on the grounds
that the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional.
Oral
Argument
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Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)
Segregation by race of private facilities engaged in interstate commerce
found to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the law, saying,
"If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter
how 'local' the operation which applies the squeeze. ... The power of Congress
to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the
local incidents thereof, including local activities l l l which have a
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce."
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Argument
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-I-
In re Gault (1967)
A woman in Gila County, Arizona, named Mrs. Cook called the county
sheriff after having received an obscene phone call. When a deputy sheriff
came to her home and took her statement, Mrs. Cook accused Gerald Gault,
a 15-year-old neighborhood boy of having made the call. Gault had a bad
reputation and was serving probation for a prior offense. The deputy sheriff
went to the Gault home, placed Gerald Gault in custody, and took him to
the juvenile detention center. The sheriff's department failed to notify
Gault's parents that their son had been taken into custody. Gault's mother
eventually got word of a hearing for her son scheduled for the following
afternoon at the juvenile detention center. She attended the hearing, where
the deputy sheriff who had conducted the investigation recounted Mrs. Cook's
accusation. Mrs. Cook was not present, nor was any record made of the proceedings.
No one was sworn in before giving testimony, Gault had no attorney with
him, and he had not been advised of his rights. The judge decided that
Gerald was "involved" in the offense and ordered him detained.
A week later,
Gault appeared at a dispositional hearing to determine what should be done
with him. Again, no record was kept, nor was he informed of his right to
remain silent or of his right to an attorney. Neither he nor his parents
were informed of the exact charges against him. During the hearing, Gault
admitted that he had dialed Mrs. Cook's phone number, but that a "friend
had done the talking." The hearing judge found Gault to be a "child in
need of supervision" and assigned him to the Arizona Youth Industrial School
until he reached age 21. While a person 18 years of age or older would
have faced a maximum penalty of a $50 fine and a jail term of two months,
Gault was sentenced to reform school for six years. He had no right to
an appeal under Arizona law. Gault's parents filed a petition for his release
which eventually reached the Supreme Court.
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Argument
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Island Trees School District v. Pico (1982)
Several school
board members of the Island Trees School District, Long Island, New York,
attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New York United, an organization
of parents concerned about the general "premissiveness" of the New York
public schools. At the conference the board members obtained lists of books
described as "objectionable for youth." Upon their return home, they found
nine books from the lists in the junior and senior high school libraries.
The books included: Slaughterhouse Five, The Naked Ape, Down These Mean
Streets, Laughing Boy, Soul on Ice, Best Short Stories of Negro Writers
(edited by Langston Hughes), and Black Boy. Calling these books
"anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy," the
members moved that they be pulled from the library shelves. In February
1976, they were removed.
A group of the
high school's students sued the school board to have the books returned,
saying that the books were removed because "passages in the books offended
their social, political, and moral tastes and not because the books, taken
as a whole, were lacking in educational value." In short, the students
claimed that their 1st Amendment rights had been denied. The Supreme Court
of New York agreed with the students. The School District appealed that
decision to the United States Supreme Court.
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-K-
Katz v. United States (1967)
Charles Katz
was suspected of involvement in illegal gambling activities in Los Angeles.
Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regularly observed
him using a public telephone, which they believed he was using to relay
gambling information. Without obtaining a warrant and without ever entering
the booth, the agents attached an eavesdropping device to the top of the
phone booth. Over subsequent days, they recorded Katz's end of conversations
to Boston and Miami. Federal prosecutors used these recordings to help
convict Katz of transmitting wagering information by telephone -- a violation
of federal law. Katz appealed and his attorneys sought wider protection
for him under the 4th Amendment than the law to date had recognized. They
argued that his conviction should be overturned because evidence against
him was gathered in an unconstitutional manner. In 1967, the case came
before the United States Supreme Court.
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Korematsu v. United States(1967)
During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional
statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese
ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially
vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California
and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. He
was prosecuted and appealed. The question presented for the Supreme
Court was whether the President and Congress went beyond their war powers
by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese
descent? The Court sided with the government and held that the need
to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black
argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified
during circumstances of "emergency and peril."
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-L-
Lemon
v. Kurtzman (1971)
In Lemon
v. Kurtzman the Court considered a Pennsylvania law that allowed the
State superintendent of schools to "purchase" certain educational services
from parochial schools. The State reimbursed the parochial schools for
books, materials, and teachers' salaries as long as the courses taught
were "secular" and the books were approved by the superintendent. A group
of Pennsylvania residents, including Lemon, sought an injunction against
Kurtzman, the superintendent of public instruction for the State of Pennsylvania,
in a Pennsylvania federal court. The court upheld the Pennsylvania law
as being legal and constitutional under the 1st Amendment. Lemon and the
group appealed.
In the second
case, Earley v. DiCenso, a Rhode Island State law established a
fund to pay a 15 percent salary supplement to teachers in parochial schools
under certain specific conditions. The schools could not exceed the per-pupil
expenditures for secular subjects taught in public schools. The teachers
whose salaries were being supplemented had to teach secular subjects as
they were taught in public schools. They had to use the same books and
materials, and they could not give religious instruction. The supplement
was paid to about 250 teachers in Roman Catholic schools. Rhode Island
taxpayers (DiCenso) brought suit against the State's Department
of Education (Earley) in a federal court. The court found the Rhode
Island law a violation of the separation of church and state as defined
by the United States Supreme Court. Rhode Island appealed.
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Lynch
v. Donnelly (1984)
The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas
display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such
objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons
Greetings," and a nativity scene. The crèche had been included in
the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display
and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket. The
question presented was whether the inclusion of a nativity scene in the
city's display violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
A divided Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that notwithstanding the
religious significance of the crèche, the city had not violated
the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the
context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort
to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display
merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate
secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing
a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed
reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."
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-M-
Mapp v. Ohio (1962)
On May 23, 1957, police
officers in a Cleveland suburb received information that a suspect in a
bombing case, as well as some illegal betting equipment, might be found
in the home of Dollree Mapp. Three officers went to the home and asked
for permission to enter, but Mapp refused to admit them without a search
warrant. Two officers left, and one remained. Three hours later, the two
returned with several other officers. Brandishing a piece of paper, they
broke in the door. Mapp asked to see the warrant and took it from an officer,
putting it in her dress. The officers struggled with Mapp and took the
piece of paper away from her. They handcuffed her for being "belligerent."
Police found
neither the fugitive nor the betting equipment during the search, but they
did discover some pornographic material in a suitcase in a closet. Mapp
said that she had loaned the suitcase to a boarder at one time and that
the contents were not her property. She was arrested, prosecuted, found
guilty, and sentenced for possession of pornographic material. No search
warrant was introduced as evidence at her trial.
Oral
Argument
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Marbury
v. Madison (1803)
William Marbury
was one of the "midnight justices," appointed a justice of the peace for
the District of Columbia in the final days of the Adams administration.
But when the Republican secretary of state, James Madison, found the appointment
documents scattered around his desk on the morning he took office, he took
them to the new President, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson felt that the last-minute
appointments another effort by Adams and the Federalists to keep a foothold
in the government, and he ordered his secretary of state not to deliver
them.
When Madison
refused to deliver Marbury's commission, Marbury asked the Supreme Court
to issue a writ of mandamus, ordering the secretary of state to surrender
the appointment. Section XIII of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme
Court the authority to resolve conflicts of this sort by issuing such writs.
Abstract
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Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984)
In 1979, Sandra
Boulware's badly beaten and burned body was found in a vacant lot in Boston.
Her boyfriend, Sheppard, was questioned in connection with the murder.
Since they had found bloodstains in a car Sheppard had borrowed, police
believed they had probable cause to obtain a warrant to search his house.
The affidavit
for the search warrant was properly completed. However, the detective leading
the investigation was unable to find the proper kind of search warrant
form, and instead used one intended for drug searches. The detective did
not include a list of specific items for which the police wanted to search.
He pointed out this omission when he presented the materials to a judge
for approval. The judge signed the warrant and told the detective that
the court would make the necessary changes in the document and attach the
list of items to the amended warrant. The changes were not made and the
defect was discovered during the trial.
Using the warrant
"in good faith" -- that is, believing the warrant to be proper, the police
searched Sheppard's home and found Sandra Boulware's bloodstained clothing.
Sheppard was prosecuted and convicted, and the clothing was used as evidence
in his trial. Sheppard's lawyers protested the introduction of that evidence.
They argued that because the warrant was "faulty," the fruits of the search
were tainted. Therefore, the evidence should have been "excluded" from
testimony because of the illegal nature of the search.
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McCulloch
v. Maryland (1819)
Among the States
unhappy with the establishment of the Second Bank of the United States
was Maryland. In those days, before the establishment of a single national
currency, local banks not only made loans, but issued their own bank notes
to serve as hand-to-hand, daily-use currency. Since these banks were not
always adequately restrained by State laws, they often issued more notes
than they were able to redeem on demand, with the result that holders of
these notes were in constant danger of losing their investment. The national
bank often publicly identified State banks that had over-extended their
notes and refused to accept notes from those banks - including many in
the State of Maryland.
The Maryland
legislature responded to this intrusion of federal authority by levying
a tax on all branches of banks "not chartered by the State of Maryland"
- a move aimed at destroying the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United
States. When called upon to pay the $15,000 annual tax, James McCulloch,
manager of the Baltimore branch, refused. McCulloch was convicted by a
Maryland court and fined $2,500. He appealed the decision to the
Maryland Supreme Court, who affirmed. Finally, McCulloch appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
Abstract
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Miller
v. California (1973)
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Miranda
v. Arizona (1966)
A kidnapping
and sexual assault occurred near Phoenix, Arizona, in March 1963. On March
13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda, 23, a Mexican national, was arrested in his
home, taken to the police station, identified by the victim, and taken
into an interrogation room. When he found out that he had been charged
with several crimes, he repeatedly asked for an attorney but his requests
were refused. Two hours later, investigators emerged from the room with
a written confession signed by Miranda. It included a typed disclaimer,
also signed by Miranda, stating that he had "full knowledge of his legal
rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me," and
that he had knowingly waived, i.e., gave up, those rights.
Two weeks later
at a preliminary hearing, Miranda again was denied counsel. Finally, at
his arraignment, a 73-year-old attorney who had not practiced criminal
law in 16 years was appointed to defend him. The lawyer persuaded Miranda
to plead guilty by reason of insanity. Miranda was convicted of robbery,
and later of kidnapping and sexual assault.
Oral
Argument
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-N-
New
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
The United States
Supreme Court set a new standard for searches in schools in this case,
stating that the school had a "legitimate need to maintain an environment
in which the learning can take place," and that to do this "requires some
easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject . . . ." The Supreme Court thus created a "reasonable
suspicion" rule for school searches, a change from the probable cause"
requirement in the wider society.
Oral
Argument
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New
York Times v. Sullivan (1964)
Abstract
and Oral Argument
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Nix v. Williams (1984)
On
December 24, 1968, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA in Des
Moines, Iowa. A witness reported having seen Robert Anthony Williams leaving
the building carrying a "big bundle." Two days later, Williams was
arrested in a town 70 miles away. Des Moines police were sent there to
take him into custody having been told by both the defense attorney and
district attorney not to "conduct any interrogation."
Emotionally
affected by sadness over a crime committed so close to Christmas, the officer
said to Williams as they drove, "the child's parents should be entitled
to a Christian burial" for their little girl. At that point Williams agreed
to tell the police officer where to find the body -- in effect confessing
to intimate knowledge of the crime. At the time that Williams identified
the spot, a large search party was two-and-one-half miles away, combing
both sides of the highway. William was tried and convicted of murder.
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Olmstead v. United States (1928)
For
a number of months, State and federal law enforcement agents conducted
an investigation of a Seattle-based bootlegging operation which smuggled
alcoholic beverages into the United States over the Canadian border a hundred
miles away. Olmstead was engaged in the illegal sale of these goods, prohibited
by the Volstead Act. Much of the case against Olmstead was based on information
gathered by a wiretap on his home telephone, placed without prior issue
of a warrant, on the telephone lines outside. Olmstead was arrested and
convicted of violations of the Volstead Act.
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Osborne
v. Ohio (1990)
Abstract
and Oral Argument
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Plessy v. Ferguson (1986)
The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway
cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths
Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He
refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.
The question presented was whether Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation
on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and
immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Supreme Court held that it did not, noting that the state law was within
constitutional boundaries. The majority upheld state-imposed racial
segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal
doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the
Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate
but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Brown conceded that the 14th amendment
intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. But
Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended
to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory
to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful
discrimination.
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Powell v. Alabama (1932)
Seven young
African American men hopped a ride aboard an empty freight train near Birmingham,
heading north through Alabama. In the empty coal car they boarded were
seven young white men and two young women, who had also hopped aboard for
transport through the State. The groups rode together in the same car of
the empty train as it moved through Alabama. A fight ensued between the
groups, and the young white men were thrown from the train. Enraged, they
telephoned ahead to the town of Scottsboro to report the incident. When
the local sheriff and a posse of citizens stopped the train before it reached
Scottsboro, the young women testified that they had each been sexually
assaulted by six of the young African American men.
All seven were
taken into custody, and when word of the allegations spread, a wave of
hostility incited angry crowds to gather around the jail house. Unable
to restrain the demonstrators or guarantee the safety of the accused, the
sheriff called for the State militia. Late in the day, soldiers took the
seven young men to Gadsen, Alabama for safekeeping.
Throughout the
proceedings, none of the seven "Scottsboro boys" was allowed to contact
their relatives, who lives out of State. On the first day of their trials,
an attorney, who was just a bystander in the courtroom, offered to help
them. The young men were prosecuted on three successive days in three successive
trials before an all-white, all-male jury. Although the young women testified
that they had been assaulted six times, they identified all seven of the
"Scottsboro boys" as their attackers. All seven were found guilty. The
sentences they faced under Alabama law ranged from imprisonment for 10
years to life, or death. Under Alabama law, the jury determined the sentence,
and it handed down the death penalty for all seven. The convictions were
appealed through the State courts of Alabama and failing there, to the
United States Supreme Court.
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Printz
v. United States (1997)
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local
chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background checks on
perspective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General
establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz
and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim
provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively.
In both cases District Courts found the background checks unconstitutional,
but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the
Brady Bill a voluntary background check system could remain. On appeal
from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background check provisions
were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated
the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States. The question
presented was whether using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article
I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate
handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's
handgun applicant background checks? The United States Supreme Court held
no. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures
are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress
may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this
case by performing background checks on applicants for handgun ownership,
the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs
to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added
that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks
of disposing of handgun application forms or notifying certain applicants
of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved
such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.
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Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
Allan Bakke,
a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the
University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both
times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one
hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative
action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions
from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test
scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the
two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in
the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded
from admission solely on the basis of race.
Oral
Argument
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Reynolds v. United States (1879)
George Reynolds, an "old order" Mormon living in the Utah Territory
under federal laws, was charged with violation of a federal law forbidding
multiple marriage in all federal territories. The Mormon religion at that
time supported plural marriages; polygamy was even seen as a religious
obligation of Mormon men under certain circumstances. Reynolds argued that
the 1st Amendment states clearly that Congress shall make no law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion. He said that the federal law
forbidding polygamy was unconstitutional because it denied his right to
the free exercise of his religion. He was convicted, sentenced, and then
he appealed.
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Roe v. Wade (1973)
In Texas, State law prohibited the termination of a pregnancy by artificial
means (surgery) except when the life of the mother was in danger. The statute
was construed as a "nearly complete ban on abortion." A Texas woman, claiming
privacy as a "fundamental right," challenged the Texas statute. In 1971
the case was argued before the United States Supreme Court. In 1972 it
was argued again. Roe and a companion case, Doe v. Bolton,
were the first cases to test, in the courts, the newly recognized "right
of privacy" against the "compelling and overriding interest" of the States
to regulate abortions.
Oral
Argument
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Rosenberger v. University
of Virginia
Return to Top
Roth
v. United States (1957)
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Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe (2000)
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council
chaplain delivered a prayer over the public address system before each
home varsity football game. Respondents, Mormon and Catholic students or
alumni and their mothers, filed a suit challenging this practice and others
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. While the suit was
pending, petitioner school district (District) adopted a different policy,
which authorizes two student elections, the first to determine whether
"invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the
spokesperson to deliver them. After the students held elections authorizing
such prayers and selecting a spokesperson, the District Court entered an
order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
prayer. The Fifth Circuit held that, even as modified by the District Court,
the football prayer policy was invalid. The Supreme Court (in a 6-3
opinion), held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated
prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause.
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Schenck
v. United States (1919)
Charles Schenck was the general secretary
of the Socialist Party of America. As noted, the Socialists believed that
the war had been caused by and would benefit only the rich, while causing
suffering and death for the thousands of poor and working-class soldiers
who would do the actual fighting in Europe. Party officials not only opposed
the war, they urged American workers to oppose the war as well.
Schenck participated in many antiwar activities
in violation of the Espionage Act, including the mailing of 15,000 to 20,000
leaflets urging draftees and soldiers to resist the draft. He was was arrested
and charged with "attempting to cause insubordination in the military and
naval forces of the United States" and with disturbing the draft. He was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison for violating the Espionage Act
of 1917, and he appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court.
Abstract
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Sheppard
v. Maxwell (1966)
The murder of Marilyn Sheppard in her bedroom
on the night of July 4, 1954, rocked the small town of Bay Village, Ohio,
a Cleveland suburb. Almost immediately suspicion arose that Dr. Samuel
Sheppard, her husband, had committed the crime. Dr. Sheppard was questioned
about the murder in the presence of several hundred people and a corps
of reporters and photographers at a county coroner's hearing. The hearing
was held in the gymnasium of the local high school. His attorney was ejected
from the hearing by the coroner for protesting the atmosphere of the proceedings.
Based in part on the results of the hearing, the county court indicted
Sheppard for the murder of his wife. He was arrested and charged on July
30. The case instantly became front page news, and local and national media
seized upon its every detail. This case inspired the television drama The
Fugitive, and a hit movie of the same name.
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Smith
v. Allwright (1944)
A resolution of the Democratic Party of Texas, a group that the Texas
Supreme Court had deemed a "voluntary association," allowed only whites
to participate in Democratic primary elections. S.S. Allwright was a county
election official; he denied Lonnie E. Smith, a black man, the right to
vote in the 1940 Texas Democratic primary. The question presented was denying
blacks the right to vote in primary elections violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, in overruling its decision in Grovey
v. Townsend (1935) found that it did, and further found the restrictions
against blacks unconstitutional. Even though the Democratic Party was a
voluntary organization, the fact that Texas statutes governed the selection
of county level party leaders, the party conducted primary elections under
state statutory authority, and state courts were given exclusive original
jurisdiction over contested elections, guaranteed for blacks the right
to vote in primaries. Allwright engaged in state action abridging Smith's
right to vote because of his race. A state cannot "permit a private organization
to practice racial discrimination" in elections, argued Justice Reed.
Abstract
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Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed. (1971)
After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of
Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools.
One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which
approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally
black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented
with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.
The question presented was whether federal courts were constitutionally
authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation?
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous
mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district
courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible.
The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness,
and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting
points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required
close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim
corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no
rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to
particular schools.
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Texas
v. Johnson (1989)
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Thompson
v. Oklahoma (1988)
On February 3, 1983, William Wayne Thompson,
along with his half-brother and two other men, murdered Thompson's former
brother-in-law who had repeatedly, physically abused Thompson's sister.
The man was severely beaten, shot twice, and cut on the throat, chest,
and abdomen. His body was then chained to a concrete block and thrown into
a nearby river. Thompson was 15 years old at the time.
The three other men were tried separately
and convicted of murder in the first degree. Each was sentenced to death.
Thompson, given his age, was treated as a juvenile offender. Then the Oklahoma
Attorney General's Office filed a petition asking that Thompson be tried
as an adult. State prosecutors argued that he was "competent and had the
mental capacity to know and appreciate the wrongfulness of his [conduct]."
They also argued that because there were no reasonable prospects for his
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system Thompson should be treated
as an adult. The court agreed, and Thompson was tried and convicted in
adult court. After the conviction, Thompson was sentenced to death.
Thompson's lawyers appealed. The State appeals court found the lower
court erred only for having allowed excessive use in-court of color pictures
of the body. Even so, the appeals court upheld Thompson's conviction. Arguing
that imposing the death sentence upon a person under the age of 16 violated
the 8th Amendment protection against "cruel and unusual punishment," Thompson's
lawyers then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
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Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist. (1969)
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-U-
U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton (1995)
United
States v. O'Brien (1968)
United States v. Leon (1984)
In 1981 police in Burbank, California, received
a tip from a confidential informant - albeit someone of unproven reliability.
The informant said that Alberto Leon and others were selling cocaine and
methoqualone from a Burbank home and other places. Police placed the home
under surveillance and discovered that five or six persons were regularly
seen there. From secretly taken photographs, police identified several
of the persons as having criminal records and previous associations with
drug selling. Another informant also told police that Leon kept a large
quantity of methaqualone at his home. While police still had the suspects
under surveillance, several of them make trips to Miami, although searches
of their luggage revealed no significant quantities of illegal drugs.
Based largely on information gathered from
the surveillance, Officer Cyril Rombach of the Burbank police prepared
an application for search warrants to enter the homes and automobiles of
the suspects. Before the warrant application was presented to a judge,
it and the evidence were reviewed by several prosecutors. At their urging,
a State judge issued the search warrant. The police searched and found
large quantities of drugs at three residences and other evidence in some
of the automobiles. Four individuals, including Leon, were indicted in
United States District Court and charged with several violations of federal
narcotics laws.
Leon's attorneys filed a motion with the trial
court to "exclude" the evidence because there was no "adequate probable
cause" for the issuance of the warrant in the first place. A federal judge
granted the motion, and the United States appealed to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. The appeals court also upheld
the "exclusion" of the evidence. Prosecutors then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, seeking modification of the exclusionary rule.
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United
States v. Lopez (1995)
Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed
weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas
law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state
charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating
a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The
act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
[he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench
trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised
release. The question presented was whether the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones
Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone,
was unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate
under the Commerce Clause?
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United
States v. Nixon (1974)
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-W-
Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)
Beginning in 1978, the Alabama State legislature
enacted a series of laws that some people believed were designed to encourage
prayer in the public schools, despite the United States Supreme Court's
previous restrictions on such activities. One 1978 law authorized a period
of silence at the beginning of the school day "for meditation." In 1981,
a second law authorized that the time be used for meditation and voluntary
prayer." Then, in 1982, the legislature authorized teachers to lead "willing
students" in a State-written, prescribed prayer to "almighty God . . .
the Creator and Supreme Judge of the World."
In an unusual decision, the federal district
judge hearing the case declared the laws constitutional, stating that "Alabama
had the power to establish a State religion if it chooses to do so." The
Jaffrees appealed. The Federal Court of Appeals overturned the judge's
findings about a State religion for Alabama and also found the two laws
in conflict with the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. Alabama
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
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Walz v. Tax Commission (1970)
Like the Federal Tax Code, the tax laws of
the State of New York provided tax-exempt status for property belonging
to non-profit associations or corporations that was "used exclusively for
religious, educational or charitable" purposes. Walz, a New York attorney
and self-professed Christian who belonged to no particular church, owned
a 22-by-29 foot plot of land on Staten Island. The City of New York assessed
its value at $100 and levied on Walz a property tax of $5.25 per year.
Walz contended that a double standard existed and requested an injunction
to prevent tax-exempt status for churches and church property. Paying his
own taxes while religious properties were tax-exempt, Walz argued, forced
him to support or subsidize religion. He claimed that indirect support
violated the 1st Amendment guarantees against the establishment of religion
by the State and, because it forced him to support churches he did not
belong to, it also violated his Free Exercise rights. The New York courts
rejected these arguments, and Walz appealed to the federal courts.
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services et al (1989)
In 1986, the Governor of Missouri signed into
law a statute which revised Missouri's standing law regarding abortions.
The state legislature passed the statute, which declared that: (1) life
begins at conception; (2) unborn children have rights; (3) public employees
and facilities are forbidden to perform abortions not necessary to save
the life of the mother, and (4) the use of public funds for counseling
about abortion is prohibited. The crucial provision in the law was a section
requiring extensive tests, for any woman 20 or more weeks pregnant and
desiring an abortion, to determine if the fetus was "viable."
In July 1986, a number of health care professionals
from public institutions, and two nonprofit corporations that provided
abortion services in Missouri, filed a motion in U.S. District Court challenging
the new law. In the first hearing for the case, the trial court declared
the Missouri law unconstitutional. That district court decision was upheld
in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. The
State of Missouri then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
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Weeks v. United States (1914)
Weeks was arrested by a San Francisco policeman
at his place of business. At the time of arrest, the officer conducted
a search of Week's office without a warrant. The search revealed evidence
about a suspected use of the U.S. mail to transmit lottery tickets, which
was prohibited by federal law. The police then also searched Weeks's home,
finding other papers that were irrelevant to the prosecution. Motivated
by the results of the searches, the United States marshal, accompanied
by local police and a federal postal inspector, returned to Weeks's home
and searched his room in a third warrantless search, carrying away more
letters and documents. Weeks filed suit to have the papers that were not
relevant returned, and also petitioned to have the evidence excluded, or
thrown out at the trial, because it was gained by an illegal search.
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Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
(1990)
In 1985, Bridget Mergens requested permission
to form a Christian student organization at Westside High School in Omaha,
Nebraska. James Finley, the school principal, denied Mergen's request.
Mergens appealed the principal's decision
in the federal courts, claiming that the school's denial was a violation
of a 1984 federal law requiring "equal access" for student religious groups.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit found that
the principal had denied Mergens her free exercise rights as guaranteed
by the 1st Amendment. The school district appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
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Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller were members
of the Old Order Amish Church. Adin Yutzy was a member of the Conservative
Amish Mennonites. ALl lived in Green County, Wisconsin. Their children
Frieda Yoder (age 15), Barbara Miller (age 15), and Vernon Yutzy (age 14)
had all graduated from a public elementary school in the Amish community.
The Amish refused to comply with a state law requiring that their children
attend school until age 16, which would have entailed sending their children
to a public high school some miles away from the Amish community. The children
did not attend any alternative school, but worked actively in the Amish
community. When Wisconsin brought the parents to court in 1971 for failure
to send the children to school, the parents were fined. On appeal, the
Wisconsin State Supreme Court found in the parents' favor, overturning
the fines. Wisconsin school officials then appealed that decision to the
United States Supreme Court.
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Chief Justice Richard
Barajas
Advanced Placement U.S. Government and Politics
Cathedral High School, El Paso, Texas